Memcached_DataObject now defines
* pkeyGetClass to avoid collision with Managed_DataObject pkeyGet
* getClassKV to avoid collision with Managed_DataObject getKV
I used this hacky sed-command (run it from your GNU Social root, or change the first grep's path to where it actually lies) to do a rough fix on all ::staticGet calls and rename them to ::getKV
sed -i -s -e '/DataObject::staticGet/I!s/::staticGet/::getKV/Ig' $(grep -R ::staticGet `pwd`/* | grep -v -e '^extlib' | grep -v DataObject:: |grep -v "function staticGet"|cut -d: -f1 |sort |uniq)
If you're applying this, remember to change the Managed_DataObject and Memcached_DataObject function definitions of staticGet to getKV!
This might of course take some getting used to, or modification fo StatusNet plugins, but the result is that all the static calls (to staticGet) are now properly made without breaking PHP Strict Standards. Standards are there to be followed (and they caused some very bad confusion when used with get_called_class)
Reasonably any plugin or code that tests for the definition of 'GNUSOCIAL' or similar will take this change into consideration.
In some brief tests, this causes no problems.
In this state however, you would need to modify DB_DataObject to have a static declaration of staticget (and probably pkeyGet). The next commit will change the staticGet overload to a unique function name (like getKV for getKeyValue), which means we can properly call the function by PHP Strict Standards.
The parent class for our database objects, Managed_DataObject, has a
dynamically assigned class in staticGet which objects get put into,
leaving us with less code to do the same thing.
We will probably have to move away from the DB_DataObject 'staticGet'
call as it is nowadays deprecated.
We always call staticGet statically, so we define it statically. Next
step is to remove a bunch of definitions of 'staticGet' from classes
that can instead fall back to a parent class in Managed_DataObject.
The ampersand is removed as we're returning a class anyway, which does
not need a reference (and when we return false, it means nothing).
It may be a bad experience for new users to immediately when trying
out the service be asked for their geographical position. Instead,
let them opt-in for this behaviour.
If you look at classes/User_group.php on line 412 in the current code, you can see that a call to $profile->getGroups() is made. This implies getGroups($offset=0, $limit=PROFILES_PER_PAGE) only giving a limited amount of groups.
This means only the first 20 groups in an ascending numerical order by locally stored User_group->id will be addressable with the bangtag syntax.
I solved this by making the getGroups() call to the same one made in Profile->isMember(), i.e. $profile->getGroups(0, null);
User::getTaggedSubscriptions()
This change escapes the $tag argument to prevent a SQL injection
attack in User::getTaggedSubscriptions(). The parameter was not
escaped higher up the stack, so this vulnerability could be exploited.
This change escapes the argument to User::getTaggedSubscribers() to
prevent SQL injection attacks.
Both code paths up the stack fail to escape this parameter, so this is
a potential SQL injection attack.
This patch escapes query parameters in Profile_tag::getTagged(). This
is an extra security step; since these parameters come out of the
database, it's unlikely that they would have dangerous data in them.
This change adds additional escapes for arguments to
Profile_tag::moveTag(). The arguments are canonicalized in the API and
Web UI paths higher up the stack, but this change makes sure that no
other paths can introduce SQL injection errors.
This patch escapes the $tag parameter in
Profile::getTaggedSubscribers(). The parameter is not escaped either
in actions/subscriptions.php or in actions/apiuserfollowers.php. So
there is a potential for SQL injection here.
This change escapes a parameter in Local_group::setNickname(). Review
of the code paths that call this function sanitize the parameter
higher up the stack, but it's escaped here to prevent mistakes later.
Note that nickname parameters are normally alphanum strings, so
there's not much danger in double-escaping them.
This change escapes a parameter in Local_group::setNickname(). Review
of the code paths that call this function sanitize the parameter
higher up the stack, but it's escaped here to prevent mistakes later.
Note that nickname parameters are normally alphanum strings, so
there's not much danger in double-escaping them.