Fix potential DoS when parsing HOST

This commit is contained in:
Nicolas Grekas 2014-08-11 10:25:24 +02:00
parent 56a75179d1
commit 5506ee8f66
2 changed files with 41 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -1147,7 +1147,8 @@ class Request
// as the host can come from the user (HTTP_HOST and depending on the configuration, SERVER_NAME too can come from the user)
// check that it does not contain forbidden characters (see RFC 952 and RFC 2181)
if ($host && !preg_match('/^\[?(?:[a-zA-Z0-9-:\]_]+\.?)+$/', $host)) {
// use preg_replace() instead of preg_match() to prevent DoS attacks with long host names
if ($host && '' !== preg_replace('/(?:^\[)?[a-zA-Z0-9-:\]_]+\.?/', '', $host)) {
throw new \UnexpectedValueException('Invalid Host "'.$host.'"');
}

View File

@ -1594,6 +1594,45 @@ class RequestTest extends \PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase
// reset request for following tests
Request::setTrustedHosts(array());
}
public function testVeryLongHost()
{
$host = 'a'.str_repeat('.a', 40000);
$start = microtime(true);
$request = Request::create('/');
$request->headers->set('host', $host);
$this->assertEquals($host, $request->getHost());
$this->assertLessThan(1, microtime(true) - $start);
}
/**
* @dataProvider getHostValidities
*/
public function testHostValidity($host, $isValid)
{
$request = Request::create('/');
$request->headers->set('host', $host);
if ($isValid) {
$this->assertSame($host, $request->getHost());
}
} else {
$this->setExpectedException('UnexpectedValueException', 'Invalid Host');
$request->getHost();
}
}
public function getHostValidities()
{
return array(
array('.a', false),
array('a..', false),
array('a.', true),
array("\xE9", false),
array('[::1]', true),
);
}
}
class RequestContentProxy extends Request